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“Nothing is original.  Steal from anywhere that resonates
with inspiration or fuels your imagination. . . . Select only
things to steal from that speak directly to your soul.  If you
do this, your work (and theft) will be authentic.  Authenticity
is invaluable; originality is nonexistent.  And don’t bother
concealing your thievery—celebrate it if you feel like it.”
- Jim Jarmusch1
INTRODUCTION
If you search for the popular electronic dance music track
“Turn Down for What” on SoundCloud, the online audio-shar-
ing platform, over 500 tracks will surface on your computer
screen.2  Most of these tracks are unofficial remixes from a
variety of music genres, everything ranging from rap to reggae,
blues to bhangra.  Even though many of these unofficial
remixes are available as free downloads, they were never au-
thorized by the original artists, their publishers, or their record
labels.3  Instead, these tracks are homegrown creations, born
out of the basements of aspiring, yet amateur, remixers.
SoundCloud, the Swedish brainchild of two entrepreneurs who
launched the site from a nightclub dance floor in 2008, prides
itself on allowing anyone to create, upload, share, and
download music.4  The platform’s self-proclaimed mantra cele-
brates the fact that “anyone can create sounds and share them
everywhere.”5  Their mission resonated with the masses;
SoundCloud boasts approximately 175 million monthly listen-
ers—a base which more than doubles the size of Pandora’s
active monthly users and roughly doubles the size of Spotify’s
free user base.6
Despite its reputation as a leader in the remix space,
SoundCloud has come under fire in recent years for serving as
1 Jim Jarmusch, Things I’ve Learned: Jim Jarmusch, MOVIEMAKER MAG.
(June 5, 2013), http://www.moviemaker.com/archives/moviemaking/directing/
jim-jarmusch-5-golden-rules-of-moviemaking/ [https://perma.cc/7J8S-CVQK].
2 Andy Hermann, How Remix Culture Lives and Dies on SoundCloud, DAILY
DOT (Aug. 28, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/entertainment/sound-
cloud-remix-problem/ [https://perma.cc/E8Y2-3BMK].
3 See id.
4 See Rob Walker, Can SoundCloud Be the Facebook of Music?, BLOOMBERG
(July 10, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-07-10/can-
soundcloud-be-the-facebook-of-music- [https://perma.cc/9WAG-XH8P].
5 About SoundCloud, SOUNDCLOUD, https://soundcloud.com/pages/contact
[https://perma.cc/JP9N-HKED].
6 Hannah Karp, Universal Music Sets Licensing Deal with SoundCloud, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 13, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/universal-mu
sic-sets-licensing-deal-with-soundcloud-1452693603 [https://perma.cc/DHN7-
LDMV].
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a safe haven for copyright infringement.7  While SoundCloud
does flag certain unauthorized content for removal, the plat-
form is notorious for letting users post remixes, mashups, and
DJ sets created with copyrighted material from other sources.8
Many have critiqued SoundCloud’s laissez-faire attitude to-
ward enforcing the material on its site, as artists, remixers, and
labels can upload songs at their leisure so long as they agree to
the site’s terms and conditions.9  Many remixers who post un-
authorized content thrive under this laid-back approach, such
as New Jersey club producer M. Breeze, whose remix of “Turn
Down for What” has received over 15,000 streams.10  “I was
just hoping and praying I never received an email saying, ‘Oh,
hey, you gotta [sic] take your song down for copyright infringe-
ment,’” M. Breeze told The Daily Dot.  As M. Breeze suspected,
that email never came: “Never have I had to take anything
down.”
Although the word “remix” never appears in SoundCloud’s
terms of service, the terms explicitly ban “any Content to which
you do not hold the necessary rights.”11  A company represen-
tative’s statement makes SoundCloud’s official stance on such
content clear: “SoundCloud is a platform for creators to share
their originally created sounds . . . . [W]here content is blocked
or removed at the direction of rightsholders because the rele-
vant rights have not been cleared, we need to take appropriate
action as a responsible hosting platform.”12  Although Sound-
Cloud could remove bootleg remixes at any time, a quick
search on the site reveals vast amounts of unauthorized mate-
rial.13  Indeed, vigilant enforcement of copyright law would un-
dermine the very inclusive, innovative atmosphere that
7 See Jonathan Keane, Is SoundCloud Becoming More Popular than Spotify?,
PASTE MAG. (Feb. 17, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/
2015/02/is-soundcloud-more-popular-than-spotify.html [https://perma.cc/
RMW7-HKR9]; Ben Sisario, SoundCloud Sued for Copyright Infringement by PRS
for Music, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/
business/media/soundcloud-sued-for-copyright-infringement-by-prs-for-music.
html [https://perma.cc/3AYU-C5UW].
8 See Hermann, supra note 2. R
9 See Ben Sisario, SoundCloud and Universal Music Agree to Licensing Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/business/
media/soundcloud-and-universal-music-agree-to-licensing-deal.html [https://
perma.cc/TVY2-LQMG].
10 See Hermann, supra note 2. R
11 SoundCloud Terms of Use, SOUNDCLOUD, https://soundcloud.com/terms-
of-use [https://perma.cc/T3GT-D4U4].
12 Hermann, supra note 2. R
13 See id.
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SoundCloud has created for its users to express their diverse
artistic visions.
While SoundCloud continued to rise in popularity without
paying any royalties, the outcry from record companies, artists,
and agencies reached a crescendo.14  Last year, PRS for Music,
a British agency that represents songwriters, sued Sound-
Cloud for copyright infringement, claiming that the streaming
service was infringing on PRS members’ copyrights by not ob-
taining licenses or paying royalties.15  The record labels were
also irked by their inability to profit off of SoundCloud’s mil-
lions of listeners, many of whom were enjoying free tracks that
infringed on the labels’ own copyrights.16  In 2014, Sound-
Cloud finally announced a licensing deal with companies such
as Red Bull, Jaguar, and Comedy Central to begin advertising
on their site so that artists and record labels could collect roy-
alties for the first time.  Later that year, Warner Music Group
became the first major record label to license its music to
SoundCloud and receive royalties each time one of their songs
is streamed on SoundCloud.17  Warner receives royalties not
just for streams of original songs but also when snippets of its
songs are spliced into remixes.  As part of the deal, Warner paid
for an equity stake of three to five percent in the company and
also indemnified SoundCloud against past copyright infringe-
ment.18  This year, Universal Music Group and Sony followed
suit with licensing deals of their own.19  Although the record
labels are still frustrated by the meager revenue that free, ad-
supported music platforms generate, they have been assuaged
by SoundCloud’s recent launch of a paid subscription service
14 See Ben Sisario, Popular and Free, SoundCloud Is Now Ready for Ads, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/business/media/
popular-and-free-soundcloud-is-now-ready-for-ads.html [https://perma.cc/
ZZ3X-C8X6].
15 See Sisario, supra note 9. R
16 See Sisario, supra note 14. R
17 See Hannah Karp, Warner Music Group Signs Deal to License Music to
SoundCloud, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 4, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/warner-music-group-nears-deal-to-license-music-to-soundcloud-14151274
25 [https://perma.cc/V6KP-NHXY].
18 See Ben Sisario, SoundCloud Signs Licensing Deal with Warner Music, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/business/media/
soundcloud-signs-licensing-deal-with-warner-music.html?_r=0 [https://perma.
cc/7BWE-F39W].
19 See Karp, supra note 6; Ben Sisario, SoundCloud Signs Licensing Deal with R
Sony, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/busi
ness/media/soundcloud-signs-licensing-deal-with-sony.html [https://perma.
cc/8VCA-EURB].
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in addition to its free platform that could potentially bring in
more revenue.20
While the record labels may be satiated at the moment,
however, SoundCloud’s decision to move toward a paid, sub-
scription model and work alongside the labels risks alienating
the platform’s primary user base.  Remix enthusiasts have
grown accustomed to the unlimited array of free music at their
fingertips and SoundCloud’s lenient approach toward infring-
ing remixes.  Remixers have thrived off of SoundCloud’s spirit
of digital democracy and fair use.21  Without having to worry
about securing content licenses from copyright holders, remix-
ers have been free to focus solely on pushing the boundaries of
the music industry.  Indeed, the rise of electronic dance music,
also known as EDM, is largely due to SoundCloud’s remix com-
munity, and today this genre of music is one of the industry’s
most popular and profitable. Despite the value to society that
remixers bring, some DJs have become so fed up with Sound-
Cloud’s ramped-up copyright enforcement that they have rec-
ommended abandoning SoundCloud in favor of alternative
websites.22
The current debate between SoundCloud users and the
music industry’s artists and record labels expands beyond the
boundaries of this one service.  The Internet is filled with web-
sites for remixers to share their creations, and sites like Mix-
cloud, Hype Machine, Indiloop, and Mixcrate continue to
struggle with these same issues.  How these audio-sharing
platforms choose to balance the tensions between remixers and
rightsholders in the near future may have a long-lasting impact
on many facets of the music industry.  These decisions will
impact how listeners consume music, how DJs produce music,
and how record labels pursue copyright infringement claims
against audio-sharing services.
By analyzing this issue through the lens of both classic and
contemporary property theories, this Note sets out to uncover
the heart of the debate that pits a collaborative remix culture
against artists’ intellectual property rights.  Part I of this Note
provides background information on the intersection between
20 See Karp, supra note 17. R
21 See David Holmes, Death to Remixes: The Enormous Hidden Threat of
Soundcloud’s ZEFR Partnership, PANDO (Apr. 10, 2015), https://pando.com/
2015/04/10/soundcloud-begins-to-take-down-unauthorized-remixes-to-ap
pease-labels-and-advertisers/ [https://perma.cc/JD9F-RLZS].
22 See Phil Morse, Why You Shouldn’t Post Your DJ Mixes on SoundCloud,
DIGITAL DJ TIPS (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.digitaldjtips.com/2011/03/why-
you-shouldnt-post-your-mixes-on-soundcloud/ [https://perma.cc/J2LB-QUFF].
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intellectual property rights and audio-sharing platforms in the
remix context.  Part II explores John Locke’s labor theory and
its application to intellectual property in the digital era.  Part III
employs classic utilitarian theory to evaluate the free rider
problem on digital music-sharing platforms, followed by an ap-
plication of Yochai Benkler’s more modern “freedom in the
commons” theory.  Part IV examines how Margaret Jane Ra-
din’s personhood theory applies to musicians and remixers in
the intellectual property context.  Part V concludes with an
application of these property theories to several potential solu-
tions that attempt to find the optimal balance between original
artists and remixing artists—two types of creators with inter-
ests that, while diametrically opposed, are each robustly justi-
fied in their own way.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Remix Culture and the Copyright Backlash
Before there were remixes, artists primarily engaged in
sampling, or “[t]he process of taking a small portion of a sound
recording and digitally manipulating it as part of a new record-
ing.”23  Although many artists are inspired by the work of art-
ists from previous generations, sampling allows musicians to
quite literally take pieces of these creations and build upon
them in a way that adds new meaning.24  Thanks to advances
in technology, sampling first arose in Jamaica in the 1960s
through musical compositions known as “dub[s].”25  Sampling
then found its way to the United States, where it gained wide-
spread acceptance throughout the hip-hop genre.26
Hip-hop is no longer the only genre of music to utilize
sampling.27  Whereas hip-hop music often requires a studio
producer to appropriate a prior work and infuse it into a new
song, a second type of sampling-based music, the remix, is
more user-friendly.  Those with software on their personal com-
puters can mix several prior works together, alter the musical
23 Sampling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see RONALD S. ROSEN,
MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 568 (2008).
24 See Robert M. Vrana, Note, The Remix Artist’s Catch-22: A Proposal for
Compulsory Licensing for Transformative, Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 811, 820 (2011).
25 See JEFF CHANG, CAN’T STOP WON’T STOP: A HISTORY OF THE HIP-HOP GENERA-
TION 30 (2005) (tracing the beginning of sampling to Jamaican DJs).
26 See id. at 41–85 (describing the migration of sampling from Jamaica to the
Bronx and its importance in early hip-hop).
27 See Vrana, supra note 24, at 821–22. R
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qualities of these songs, and then create new pieces of music to
overlay on top of them.28  Professional remix music has re-
cently started to appear on pop radio stations, with renowned
DJs making appearances on Top 40 stations.29  Despite the
popularity of this new music form, copyright law has struggled
to adapt.
Sampling initially went unnoticed by the legal regime.
Bands such as the Beastie Boys utilized sampling heavily
throughout their work at a time “when record companies were
paying less attention to these legal issues.”30  Courts soon be-
gan to recognize the legal implications, however, and held that
unlicensed sampling constituted copyright infringement.31
Many copyright critics have lamented this outcome for depriv-
ing the music world of truly pioneering art.32  One notable ex-
ample is DJ Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album, which fused the
rhythms and chords from the Beatles’ White Album with the
lyrics from rapper Jay-Z’s Black Album.  Despite music critics’
praise for the record as an innovative masterpiece, executives
at EMI, the label that owns the rights to the Beatles’ sound
recordings, sent a cease and desist order to DJ Danger Mouse
along with the record stores and eBay retailers that were selling
his remix album.33  As a result of this debacle over DJ Danger
Mouse’s work, Glenn Otis Brown, the executive director of a
Web-based copyright-licensing group called Creative Com-
mons, criticized the U.S. copyright system as “two-tiered” for
treating commercial albums differently than unofficial remixes
released in the depths of the digital remix scene.34  “Labels are
saying, ‘If you do (a remix) on the underground scene, it’s OK.
28 See id. at 822.
29 See id. at 827.
30 See id. at 820–21 (quoting Robert Levine, Steal This Hook?  D.J. Skirts
Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, at E1).
31 See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182,
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing the Old Testament’s declaration that “[t]hou shalt not
steal” and holding that “stealing” music by sampling constitutes copyright in-
fringement (quoting Exodus 20:15)).
32 See Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED (Feb. 14,
2004), http://archive.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/02/62276?
currentPage=all [https://perma.cc/P7UZ-YW65].
33 See id. (citing outstanding reviews of The Grey Album by publications such
as The Boston Globe (“the most intriguing hip-hop album in recent memory”) and
Rolling Stone (“[t]he ultimate remix record”) (quoting Renee Graham, Jay-Z, the
Beatles Meet in ‘Grey’ Area, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 12, 2004), http://archive.boston.
com/news/globe/living/articles/2004/02/10/jay_z_the_beatles_meet_in_grey_
area/ [https://perma.cc/63X2-CJSJ]; Lauren Gitlin, DJ Makes Jay-Z Meet
Beatles, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/
news/dj-makes-jay-z-meet-beatles-20040205 [https://perma.cc/W2GS-83UT]).
34 Id.
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But if it’s so compelling that people trade it all over the Internet,
then we’re going to sue you.’”35
B. Licensing Sampling-Based Music
The Copyright Act of 1976 grants copyright holders the
exclusive right to create “derivative works,” or works that are
based upon the copyrighted work.36  The Copyright Act notes
that a derivative work can take any “form in which a work may
be recast, transformed, or adapted.”37  The broad scope of this
derivative works right allows artists to create and sell remixes
of their own songs.  Additionally, artists can choose to license
their songs to remixers, which ensures that the original artists
receive compensation in return.
The process of licensing music seems simple on its face.
Before an artist can sample copyrighted music, that artist must
secure separate permission for both the sound recording and
the composition of the copyrighted work.38  For sound record-
ings, often the copyright owner is a record company or the
record producer.  For compositions, the copyright owner is gen-
erally the songwriter.  These ownership interests, however, are
often assigned to blanket licensing organizations or music pub-
lishers, who then offer access to their music catalogues to
those who are willing to pay.  Licensing agreements to sample
another’s work generally include terms that define whether the
license is exclusive or nonexclusive, the term of the agreement,
the payment method (flat fee, royalty, or both), the rights of the
licensee (including how much of the song can be sampled), a
courtesy credit to the owner if the owner desires, and rights of
the owner (such as the right to terminate upon breach of the
agreement).
This process can be burdensome for artists for a whole
host of reasons.  An artist might desire to sample many tracks
for a song or lack knowledge regarding the licensing process.
Alternatively, a rightsholder might demand a prohibitively ex-
pensive price for the license or refuse to approve the license
altogether.39 Fees and conditions for licenses vary greatly, but
when a song is not well known and only a small portion of it will
35 Id.
36 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
37 17 U.S.C. § 106 note (2012) (General Scope of Copyright).
38 AMBER NICOLE SHAVERS, THE LITTLE BOOK OF MUSIC LAW 199–200 (2013).
39 See id.
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be used, flat fees generally fall between $1,000 and $5,000.40
For more popular songs, prices range closer to $5,000 and
$50,000 per license.  Even if an artist successfully secures a
licensing agreement, artists also have to be careful not to in-
fringe on the agreement.41  Such was the case with the English
rock band, The Verve, who sampled a portion of an orchestral
version of The Rolling Stones’ “The Last Time” for their hit song,
“Bittersweet Symphony.”42  The riff from the sample became
the song’s signature feature, though the band incorporated ad-
ditional layers of melody, harmony, original lyrics, and other
changes.  The Verve successfully secured permission to sample
both the sound recording and the composition of “The Last
Time,” and upon release “Bittersweet Symphony” became a
wild success.43  Once the song became popular, however, the
owner of the composition copyright for “The Last Time” claimed
that the band had infringed upon his copyright by sampling
more of the track than they had previously agreed upon.
Rather than face the prospect of drawn-out litigation, The
Verve agreed to settle with the copyright owner for a high
price—100% of the publishing rights for “Bittersweet
Symphony.”
C. Remixes and the Fair Use Defense
Despite its popularity as a music genre, the legality of user-
generated remixes remains murky.44  This is no surprise, given
that such remixes rely on a fair use doctrine that is intention-
ally flexible and contextual.45  The doctrine of fair use is an
exception within federal copyright law and a remixer’s dream.46
Fair use allows creators to use an author’s copyrighted work
without permission and serves as a defense against liability for
copyright infringement.47  Courts evaluate these unauthorized
uses on a case-by-case basis using four factors set out in Sec-
tion 107 of the Copyright Act: (1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
40 See Reuven Ashtar, Theft, Transformation, and the Need of the Immaterial:
A Proposal for a Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 261,
273 (2009).
41 See SHAVERS, supra note 38, at 203. R
42 See id. at 198.
43 See id. at 201.
44 See Vrana, supra note 24, at 837. R
45 See id. at 833, 841.
46 See SHAVERS, supra note 38, at 215. R
47 See id. at 215–16.
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copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.  Of these four factors, the first one—the
purpose and character of the use—often holds the most weight.
For this factor, courts ask whether the new work is “transform-
ative” or whether it alters the original in a way that adds new
meaning, expression, or message.48  As this multifactor test
illustrates, the line dividing copyright infringement and fair use
is highly contextual; “there is no formula to ensure that a pre-
determined percentage or amount of a work—or specific num-
ber of words, lines, pages, copies—may be used without
permission.”49
Section 107 singles out examples of activities that are gen-
erally regarded as fair use, such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.50  Another type
of activity that often qualifies as fair use is parody.51  Such was
the case with the landmark case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., where hip-hop group 2 Live Crew created a satiric
take on the popular Roy Orbison song, “Oh, Pretty Woman.”
The Supreme Court found that 2 Live Crew’s song “reasonably”
commented on or criticized the original and that this social
commentary rendered the track sufficiently transformative to
qualify for the fair use defense.52
When it comes to remixes, however, case law on fair use is
very scarce.53  The first case to address sampling, Grand Up-
right Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, involved rapper Biz
Markie’s unlicensed sampling of an instrumental section and
three-word phrase from the song “Alone Again (Naturally)” by
singer-songwriter Gilbert O’Sullivan.  While this case might
seem ripe for fair use analysis, the judge concluded that Biz
Markie committed copyright infringement without considering
fair use at all.  Instead, the judge noted that “[t]he only issue
. . . seems to be who owns the copyright to the song ‘Alone
Again (Naturally)’ and the master recording thereof made by
Gilbert O’Sullivan.”54  A more recent sampling case, Bridgeport
48 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
49 More Information on Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://copyright.gov/
fair-use/more-info.html [https://perma.cc/A9WE-CBF4].
50 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
51 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (establishing that commercial parodies can
qualify for fair use status).
52 See id. at 583; SHAVERS, supra note 38, at 217. R
53 See Vrana, supra note 24, at 834–38. R
54 See 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, involved the hip-hop group
N.W.A.’s recording, which sampled a three-note guitar solo
from a Funkadelic recording.55  The court originally seemed to
follow in the footsteps of Grand Upright Music and succinctly
directed artists to “[g]et a license or do not sample.”56  The
court later amended its opinion to allow the district court to
consider fair use on remand, sending mixed signals to remixers
in the process.57
The lack of clear guidelines for remixers has led to much
confusion about how the fair use doctrine applies to their craft.
This confusion presents unique problems for audio-sharing
platforms that remove remixes from their websites, despite the
fact that many people believe these works satisfy the require-
ments of fair use.  Among these fair use advocates is acclaimed
mash-up artist Gregg Gillis, also known as Girl Talk, as well as
his congressman, Representative Mike Doyle, who defended
Gillis during a hearing on the future of radio.58  While the de-
bate between remix enthusiasts and copyright holders rages on
in Washington, the national press, and the DJ community, an
examination of traditional and contemporary property theory
sheds some unexpected yet highly valuable insight onto this
issue.
II
A REMIXER’S LABOR OF LOVE: LOCKEAN THEORY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. An Introduction to Locke’s Labor Theory
John Locke revolutionized property theory with his insight
that an individual who mixes his labor with an unowned re-
source acquires a natural property right in the final resource
that he creates.59  If a craftsman wanders onto a pristine forest,
chops down a big oak tree, and transforms the lumber into
beautiful birdhouses, he has therefore earned a property right
in the birdhouses.  Through his labor, he privatized that which
had previously been in the state of nature.  Locke reasoned that
humans have natural property rights in their own persons and
55 See 410 F.3d 792, 795–96 (6th Cir. 2005).
56 Id. at 801.
57 See Vrana, supra note 24, at 838–39; Robert Levine, Steal This Hook? D.J. R
Skirts Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
08/07/arts/music/07girl.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A4KN-GQ9W].
58 See Holmes, supra note 21. R
59 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEN˜ALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY 36–37 (2012).
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by extension, in their own labor.60  The source of his theory
comes from natural law, which confers rights and duties onto
human beings, as God’s “property.”61  These rights and duties
include the duty to preserve oneself and the corresponding
right to use natural resources in furtherance of fulfilling this
obligation.62  Locke qualifies his theory, however, with two ma-
jor constraints.  First, a person may not appropriate more than
he can use before it spoils.63  Second, a person may appropri-
ate out of the commons only where “there is enough, and as
good left in common for others.”64  These two constraints are
often referred to as the “spoilage proviso” and the “sufficiency
proviso,” respectively.
As timeless and celebrated as Locke’s theory is, it also has
received its fair share of criticism.  One primary contention
with labor theory is that Locke does not justify his assump-
tions.65  Locke simply assumes natural law grants us property
rights and, consequently, that we have a robust property right
to the resources from our labor—rather than a mere use right,
for example.  Robert Nozick illustrated the holes in labor theory
with his clever musing: “If I own a can of tomato juice and spill
it in the sea so that its molecules . . . mingle evenly throughout
the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly
dissipated my tomato juice?”66
One reading of Locke presents an appealing alternative to
Nozick’s objection.  James Tully interprets Locke’s labor-mix-
ing argument as a broader commitment to the principle that a
maker is entitled to own the things that she intentionally
brings into being.67  Indeed, this notion of makers’ rights ap-
pears throughout Locke’s writings.  Tully’s reading explains not
only why labor confers ownership rights over the resulting re-
source but also why Locke assumes a maker owns her labor to
begin with—because she creates this labor by exercising her
own intellect and will.
While Tully’s reading leaves open questions of the exact
extent of property rights created from labor, some scholars
have responded by highlighting one of Locke’s key assertions:
60 See id. at 37–39.
61 See id. at 39.
62 See id. at 37.
63 See id. at 39–40.
64 Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 27 (Mark Goldie ed.,
1993)).
65 See id. at 46–51.
66 Id. at 46 (quoting ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 46 (1974)).
67 See id. at 47–48.
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“the greatest part of the value in things is the result of human
labor.”68  Locke’s discussion focuses on use value rather than
exchange value; the usefulness of products to those who con-
sume them, Locke claims, is mostly due to the human labor
that went into creating such products, regardless of how such
products are valued in the market.69  In Nozick’s juice hypo-
thetical, for instance, his labor of spilling the juice can did not
add any value to a vast and still pristine sea.  Yet if a laborer
contributes more to the use value of the final product than the
value of the raw materials that were taken from the commons,
the justification for embracing the labor theory is far more per-
suasive, though not infallible.  The value-argument reading is a
key element of Lockean theory; however, there are still several
unresolved issues that pose problems.  For example, how
should property law measure the value an individual adds to a
product, and moreover, what happens when a product is cre-
ated through cooperative labor between more than one
person?70
B. A Lockean Approach to Intellectual Property and Remix
Rights
Some scholars have called for a renunciation of intellectual
property rights in the digital era simply because they believe
that enforcing copyrights in an age where information can be
freely obtained and copied is a virtual impossibility.71  Yet
“[c]opy-protection schemes are currently available for any kind
of intellectual property that takes digital form.”72  Indeed,
SoundCloud recently implemented an “automatic content iden-
tification system” that identifies audio that rightsholders have
requested to be removed from SoundCloud.73  Traditional poli-
cies of copyright law should be retained in the intellectual
property context, and here Locke’s labor theory still bears
force.
First, Locke’s natural law foundation for labor theory ap-
plies not only to physical property but also to intellectual prop-
68 Id. at 48.
69 See id. at 49.
70 See id. at 48–50.
71 See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994, 12:00
PM), http://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/ [https://perma.cc/
9MBX-JDTV].
72 Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L.
REV. 65, 72 n.45 (1997).
73 Q&A: Our New Content Identification System, SOUNDCLOUD (Jan. 5, 2011),
https://blog.soundcloud.com/2011/01/05/q-and-a-content-identification-sys
tem/ [https://perma.cc/92GQ-JVFR].
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erty.  If God granted man the right to appropriate apples from a
tree for self-preservation, surely this right extends to those who
preserve themselves through labor not just of the body but also
of the mind.74  In the same way that a farmer feeds his family
by tilling the land and harvesting crops, so too does a musician
feed her family by creating songs for others to enjoy.  Second,
the maker’s rights interpretation not only fits within the physi-
cal property context but it also applies to intellectual property
in a more robust way.  If we have a right to assert control over a
tree that grows in a forest, surely we have a right to control “the
contents of our minds,” such as our thoughts, ideas, and inspi-
rations.75  Whereas our craftsman might have doubled the
value of raw timber by transforming it into a birdhouse, for
instance, a musician who creates a song seemingly out of noth-
ing has certainly contributed more use value to the final prod-
uct because she has not taken anything out of the commons.
Third, Locke’s constraints on his theory are also less of a threat
in the world of intellectual property.  The spoilage proviso is not
at issue because ideas cannot spoil like apples on a tree.  Simi-
larly, the sufficiency proviso only becomes a threat in a situa-
tion with limited resources, but ideas are virtually limitless.
Although Locke’s labor theory initially seems stronger in
the intellectual property context, certain loopholes that plague
Lockean theory in the tangible context still plague the theory in
the world of intellectual property, too.  For instance, while it
might be easier to say that an artist has contributed the major-
ity of her song’s value than it is to say the same for an appropri-
ation in the commons, she is not truly creating her song out of
nothing.  All artists draw inspiration from those who have come
before them.  Artists are inspired by different musical genres
and lyrical styles, which would not be in existence without the
labor of others.  Artists even rely on inventors of instruments
such as the piano and the guitar, as well as equipment such as
the mixing boards used in studios.  Isolating the individual
value that an artist adds is difficult in the intellectual property
context, just as it is in the physical property context.76
Another loophole that casts shadows onto an application of
labor theory to intellectual property is the Lockean “paradox of
plenty,” which seems to be absent from the intellectual prop-
erty context.77  Coined by Gopal Sreenivasan, the paradox of
74 See Moore, supra note 72, at 77. R
75 See id. at 78.
76 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 59, at 49. R
77 See id. at 39.
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plenty notes that if every individual in the commons had to give
actual consent before someone could pick apples from a tree
and consume them, for example, everyone would starve in spite
of the bountiful resources that God has provided.  Yet intellec-
tual property is not rivalrous like physical goods are.78  Only
one person can consume a physical good at a time, whereas a
song can be enjoyed by millions of people simultaneously
across airwaves or platforms like SoundCloud.  Given this key
distinction, the need for Lockean labor theory seems less press-
ing in the intellectual property context.
If an artist has the exclusive right to use and control her
work, however, the second of Locke’s provisos also poses
problems in the realm of intellectual property.  Artists must
leave “enough, and as good” for others in the commons.79  On
the one hand, this proviso seems impossible to violate.
Whereas a finite amount of resources is available to appropri-
ate in the world of physical property, there is a nearly infinite
frontier from which artists draw inspiration: their imagination.
Artists can always create new songs; one artist’s original song
will not prevent another artist from later creating an original
song of her own.  On the other hand, certain artists create their
work exclusively by taking preexisting songs and putting their
own spin on them.  Indeed, this is precisely what professional
remixers and DJs do in their careers.  Gregg Gillis of Girl Talk
is famous for his “mash-ups” of songs by other artists.80  Gillis
does not pay these artists licensing fees, despite the fact that
he makes sales off of his albums and sold-out stadium shows.
For a DJ who uses hundreds of samples to create his work, it
might very well be prohibitively expensive for Gillis to purchase
a license from each and every artist.  Moreover, if artists re-
fused to grant licenses for their songs or required steep royal-
ties, these obstacles might endanger the work that Gillis does.
In this way, artists might not leave “enough, and as good” in
the commons for those who make their living in the remix
realm of the music industry.  Remixers require access to soci-
ety’s “preexisting cultural matrix” to create their craft, and ex-
cluding remixers from accessing the songs that comprise this
78 See Moore, supra note 72, at 77. R
79 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 59, at 39–40 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, R
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 27 (Mark Goldie ed., 1993)).
80 Rob Walker, Mash-up Model, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 20, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/20wwln-consumed-t.html [https://
perma.cc/R69A-TTDH].
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culture can stifle their creativity.81  The public domain there-
fore might not be as accommodating as Lockean theory would
suggest that it should be.  This proviso could have interesting
implications for government regulation of copyright, as a com-
pulsory licensing system would allow remixers access to a far
wider range of music, all the while promoting the enforcement
of copyright law.82
While these contradictions cast doubt on a robust regime
of Lockean rights in intellectual property, this is not to say that
these complications mandate a wholesale renunciation of labor
theory in this context.  Rather, a well-rounded approach
should accordingly temper property rights with qualifications
as justified.  Indeed, copyright law in the United States cur-
rently carves out room for such exceptions.  Most notably, the
fair use doctrine permits the unauthorized use of copyrighted
material when a use is transformative, or “adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message.”83  The court’s
logic behind transformative use is consistent with Lockean the-
ory, as transformative parodies are deemed to have added the
bulk of the use value of the final product.  If a parody’s com-
mentary has “no critical bearing on the substance or style of
the original composition,” that parody is more likely to succeed
on a fair use defense than if the parody merely serves as a
“market substitute” for the original.84  Given that fair use must
be decided on a case-by-case basis, however, it puts remixing
artists in a vulnerable position.  Even if a remixing artist truly
believes that they have met the requirements of fair use, they
cannot know whether their work meets the fair use standard
until after they have already been found liable for copyright
infringement.85
C. The Law of Accession and the Improving Remixer
The heart of the battle over remix rights boils down to the
question of what happens when one artist’s imagination builds
on another’s.  Here the value argument that was so crucial to
81 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individ-
ualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1563,
1567–1571 (1993) (“[O]nce a creator exposes her intellectual product to the pub-
lic, and that product influences the stream of culture and events, excluding the
public from access to it can harm.”).
82 See Vrana, supra note 24, at 850–54. R
83 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
84 See id. at 580, 587.
85 See Vrana, supra note 24, at 849. R
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understanding Lockean theory is quite uncertain because iso-
lating labor is extremely difficult in the remix context.  Con-
sumers enjoy remixes not only because of the changes that the
remixer made but also because of the qualities of the original
song that are still retained, such as the lyrics, melody, and
instrumentation.  Moreover, remixers also satisfy the same
natural law and maker’s rights justifications of labor in the
same way as the original artist.
In light of this uncertainty, the law of accession offers some
guidance on how property law should measure the value that
an individual adds to an object when a product is created
through cooperative labor.86  This doctrine can be seen with
one simple tweak to our craftsman example: instead of an
abandoned forest, imagine that our craftsman accidentally
chopped a tree from a lumberjack’s property.  According to the
law of accession, an individual who innocently takes a previ-
ously owned object, transforms it beyond recognition, and adds
a significant amount of value in the process will usually gain
ownership of the final product.87  However, this right to owner-
ship does not entirely supplant the rights enjoyed by the origi-
nal owner; the law of accession also imposes an obligation to
compensate the original owner of the raw materials for the lost
value.  The craftsman would therefore be entitled to keep his
handcrafted birdhouses so long as he pays the lumberjack the
fair market value for the tree.
According to the law of accession, a remixing artist who
innocently takes the song of another artist and alters it in a
way that adds value should be entitled to retain a property
right in the remix, so long as the remixer compensates the
original artist for the value of the raw materials.  If the remixer
did not have to compensate the original artist for nontrans-
formative uses, the original artist’s property rights granted by
the labor theory would be completely moot.  Remixers could
profit off of the labor invested by original artists, without recog-
nizing the property rights of the original artists through prior
agreements and licensing fees.  Enforcing copyright law ac-
knowledges both the work of the original artist, through any
licensing fees or royalties that the artist may receive, as well as
the work of the remixer, who can profit either by sales of the
remix or increased name recognition and publicity.
Interestingly, the improving trespasser doctrine in adverse
possession law might also afford remixers the right to compen-
86 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 59, at 48–50. R
87 See id. at 48–49.
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sation if they increase the value of an artist’s original song.  To
illustrate this doctrine, imagine that an individual mistakenly
builds a new house on her neighbor’s lot, all the while believing
that lot to be her own because of a surveying error.  In the
United States, most states afford some relief to such an improv-
ing trespasser.88  To prevent the lot owner’s unjust enrichment,
a good faith improver can either remove the improvement she
added or receive compensation equal to the increase in market
value of the lot owner’s land.  In the intellectual property con-
text, a similar situation might arise if a famous remixer im-
proves upon the track of a relatively unknown artist.  By taking
the artist’s song and turning it into a viral hit, the remixer has
arguably contributed far more value to the resulting remix than
the original artist; without the work of the remixer, the original
artist’s song might have remained undiscovered.  In such cir-
cumstances, the improving trespasser doctrine might prevent
the unjust enrichment of the original artist by requiring that
she compensate the remixer for the increase in market value of
her song.  Once again, however, issues of indeterminacy in
isolating labor remain.
It is worth noting that the law of accession’s good faith
requirement would exempt remixers who knowingly disregard
copyright law and SoundCloud’s terms of use.89  Yet copyright
law is complex, and many SoundCloud users likely do not un-
derstand the nuances of the fair use doctrine.  SoundCloud
would therefore do well to outline the fair use defense in more
detail, lessening the likelihood that a remixer could hold a good
faith belief that their tracks are exempt from copyright infringe-
ment.  While SoundCloud advises users to obtain authorization
from artists rather than rely on the fair use defense, Sound-
Cloud also suggests that those who wish to rely on fair use
should “consult with a suitably qualified lawyer before upload-
ing anything.”90  This is problematic because most remixers on
SoundCloud are amateurs who likely lack the resources to hire
such counsel.  Good faith exception or not, however, the law of
accession still illustrates the balance that needs to occur in
order to pay respect to both the artist’s right in an original song
and the remixer’s right in the new rendition.
88 See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 510 (3d ed. 2012).
89 See Hermann, supra note 2 (sharing the stories of remixers who knowingly R
disregard SoundCloud’s terms of service).
90 Learn About Copyright, SOUNDCLOUD, https://soundcloud.com/pages/cop
yright [https://perma.cc/W959-K5UE].
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III
FOSTERING MUSICAL CREATION: UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. The Tragedy of the Free Rider
Utilitarianism evaluates whether actions, rules, and insti-
tutions are right or wrong based on the consequences they
bring about, and in turn, whether these consequences tend to
maximize utility or welfare.91  Rather than a single utilitarian
theory, there are many theories that are influenced by the phi-
losophy of utilitarianism.  One of these theories is the classic
“free rider” problem.  This account illustrates the underproduc-
tion that occurs when an open-access regime fails to provide
adequate incentives for individuals to engage in labor.92  To see
how this phenomenon works in practice, imagine an open-ac-
cess field that is being used to grow corn.  In order to eat the
corn that grows in this open-access field, however, individuals
need to help till, sow, weed, and harvest the crop.  Yet the users
of the field did not build a fence around their property, and they
therefore have no power to exclude farmers who do not contrib-
ute any labor from harvesting the corn at the last minute.
Under the rational actor model of utilitarianism, an individual
actor acting independently will always take the self-interested
route, even if this cost-benefit analysis leads to behavior that is
contrary to the best interests of the whole group.  The most
cost-effective course of action for a rational actor would be to
avoid contributing labor while others do all the work and then
suddenly swoop in when the crops are ready for harvest.  Yet if
each individual thinks about utility on such an individual
scale, no one will ever have any corn to eat.
The free rider problem applies with just as much force in
the realm of intellectual property.  If an artist cannot reap the
full benefits from her songs, which she invested time, money,
and labor in creating, utilitarian theory suggests that this artist
will not invest as heavily in her craft as she otherwise would
have—if she even chooses to continue investing in her craft at
all.  While this result might not be as easy to observe as corn
failing to grow in a field, upon deeper inspection the disadvan-
tages of the free rider problem begin to appear in the intellec-
tual property context, too.  For example, many tracks on
SoundCloud are only remixed minimally, while others are iden-
tical to the original and merely disguised as a remix so people
91 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 59, at 11. R
92 See id. at 22.
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can listen to or download these songs for free.  Such practices
are likely to interfere with the original song’s market sales; free
access to slightly modified versions of a song may satisfy con-
sumers who otherwise would have paid for the original ver-
sion.93  Indeed, some artists will refuse to release their music to
the public unless it is properly protected—either because they
feel their work is being devalued or because they have found a
more profitable career path.94  Though difficult to measure,
this negative utility would be felt not only by artists exiting the
industry but also by the larger community of music consumers
who have less music to choose from.  Creating and protecting
intellectual property rights in an artist’s music therefore pro-
vides incentives for the artist to engage in the labor necessary
to produce such music, which consequently brings utility to
society on a large scale.
On the other hand, too many restrictions on intellectual
property can also stifle innovation and creativity.  Depriving
remixers of access to prior creations is fatal to their craft;
remixes necessarily require the use of prior songs, by defini-
tion.  If it were overly burdensome or expensive for remixing
artists to use original songs as the bedrock of their creations,
the public would have less remixes available to listen to.  Per-
haps only the most mainstream DJs would be able to engage in
this art form, leaving young, aspiring remixers without the abil-
ity to share their work with a mass audience and gain a follow-
ing of their own.  SoundCloud’s easily accessible remixes
therefore bring utility to the public at large.
As with Lockean theory, there are still complications to the
application of utilitarianism in the intellectual property con-
text.  First, utilitarian theory relies heavily on the assumption
that individuals invariably abide by the rational actor model.
Yet people in a particular community are not always self-inter-
ested.95  These individuals therefore cannot fit neatly into a
rational actor model that assumes people make their decisions
using an individual, cost-benefit calculus that prioritizes creat-
93 See IVAN L. PITT, DIRECT LICENSING AND THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: HOW TECHNOLOGY,
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION RESHAPED COPYRIGHT LICENSING 199–204 (2015).
94 See Jacob Ganz, The Decade in Music: How Musicians Create, NPR (Dec. 3,
2009, 3:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2009/12/03/121061383/the-decade-in-
music-how-musicians-create [https://perma.cc/5Q6B-QDSS] (describing the
meaning behind singer-songwriter Gillian Welch’s song, “Everything Is Free”: “It’s
the ultimate threat that the artist has at any point to stop sharing their art with
the world.  And what’s sort of implied in our song is, ‘I can keep doing what I do
and I can entertain myself and don’t need to take it out of my living room.’  If it
ceases to be feasible to make a living, I could just stop going public.”).
95 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 59, at 25. R
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ing the greatest net wealth.  Sometimes individuals are altruis-
tic; these individuals will naturally refrain from using
resources in an open-access regime as aggressively as possible
so that others can share in the resources as well.  A remixer
might seek out the permission of the original artist not out of
fear of being sued, but out of gratitude toward the artist.  Simi-
larly, some artists might not care about remixers using their
music and then giving away the remixes as free downloads.
These artists might desire to help remixers build their careers,
or perhaps they simply enjoy the flattery.  A quick look at
SoundCloud and remix culture in the news, however, illus-
trates that for the most part the players involved are acting as
rational actors would act.  Girl Talk has no interest in paying
the hundreds of artists that he has sampled out of the generos-
ity of his heart.  Meanwhile, last year Universal Music Group
and Sony Music Entertainment were reportedly preparing to
file lawsuits against SoundCloud for “massive copyright in-
fringement,” as they have no interest in helping remixers profit
off their artists royalty free.96  The rational actor model there-
fore seems like a fair starting point for an application of utilita-
rian theory—while also keeping in mind that copyright law
should leave room for those who wish to break the mold of the
rational actor model, such as artists who offer their tracks to
amateur remixers for free through Creative Commons licenses,
for instance.
Given such a wide range of human interests, even within
the relatively small context of the remix culture, utilitarian-
ism’s attempt to create a complete account of aggregate well-
being on a single value is a tall order.  It is difficult to say with
certainty, for instance, that the added utility of widely available
remixes outweighs the negative utility generated by the disin-
centives for original artists to create.  Any policy proposals
utilizing this theory in the intellectual property context would
be smart, therefore, to incorporate both perspectives in its
calculus to find the optimal balance rather than prioritizing
one side over the other wholesale.
96 Pulkit Chandna, Rumor Has It Universal Music Group and Sony Music Are
Gearing Up to Sue SoundCloud for ‘Massive’ Infringement, TECHHIVE (June 24,
2015, 9:47 PM), http://www.techhive.com/article/2940554/rumor-has-it-uni
versal-music-group-and-sony-music-are-gearing-up-to-sue-soundcloud-for-
massive-infr.html [https://perma.cc/7Y9W-R9CE] (quoting Paul Resnikoff, Ex-
clusive: Soundcloud Bracing for Massive Copyright Infringement Lawsuits . . .,
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (June 22, 2015), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/
06/22/exclusive-soundcloud-bracing-for-massive-copyright-infringement-law
suits/ [https://perma.cc/XUE2-3EHA]).
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B. The Freedom in the Commons
Not all utilitarian scholars fret over the free rider problem,
such as Yochai Benkler, who views open-access regimes in a
far more favorable light.97  In his lecture, Freedom in the Com-
mons, Benkler contends that the technological revolution has
made a public domain of information and culture both plausi-
ble and desirable.98  The rise of technology has created what
Benkler calls the “networked information economy,” an econ-
omy where information and culture flow throughout society
across a decentralized network of individuals, rather than a
centralized network of large companies.99  Benkler highlights
the enormous potential of the Internet, through its democrati-
zation of the way that we produce culture, to promote individ-
ual creativity and diversify social discourse.100  In the process,
Benkler notes that these nonmarket and decentralized models
of production can increase their presence alongside the more
traditional, commercial models—surely causing some displace-
ment but not enough to displace businesses and markets
entirely.101
Benkler’s theory, while controversial to proponents of
strong intellectual property protection, remains rooted in utili-
tarian theory and has significant implications for remix cul-
ture.  In a networked information economy, Benkler asserts,
robust intellectual property rights can lead to economic ineffi-
ciencies, especially with respect to nonmarket actors.102  For
example, amateur remixers cannot make valuable contribu-
tions to the music industry if they lack the financial resources
to gain access to original songs protected by robust rights.  An
aspiring DJ living in his parents’ basement likely does not have
the resources to get approval from the record label that re-
leased a song that he wants to remix.  He might therefore be
limited only to songs that artists have released under a Crea-
tive Commons license.  Moreover, nonmarket individuals no
longer need access to a professional studio or a record label to
craft and distribute a quality remix.  Aspiring DJs can use
widely available cheap processors such as their laptop com-
97 Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1245–50 (2003).
98 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY 227
(2012).
99 Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information, in PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY, supra note 98, at 217, 218–21. R
100 Id.
101 Id. at 219.
102 Id. at 218.
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puters, thereby reducing the physical capital costs associated
with the production and distribution of a song.103  Despite the
potential for such a thriving, cost-efficient addition to the mu-
sic industry, restrictive intellectual property rights could chill
such production.
Not only does Benkler note that the networked information
economy makes sense from an economic perspective but he
also notes that it is desirable from a political perspective.  Ben-
kler argues that proprietary- and market-based production has
“dampening effects” on two core values: democracy and auton-
omy.104  A market-based system that enforces property rights
forces individual consumers to pay market-based providers.105
This system allows the mass media to define cultural meaning
in society rather than society itself.106  When nonmarket par-
ticipants such as the amateur remixers of SoundCloud partici-
pate in the dissemination of cultural products, our music
industry becomes more musically diverse and democratic.
Without these nonmarket actors, we likely would never experi-
ence the joys of a Bhangra-inspired Beyonce´ remix or a 1980s
take on Justin Bieber; there is simply not a mass media market
for such creations.107  Yet there is value in a diverse array of
tunes for us to choose from.  The networked information econ-
omy also fosters individual autonomy, as it allows individuals
to retain more control of the media that they consume—rather
than passively letting a monopoly of record companies serve as
gatekeepers for their musical taste.108
Certainly Benkler’s argument, if taken to the extreme,
would have drastic consequences for the music industry.  If all
artists had to place their tracks in an open-access system
where users could freely download, alter, and resell them,
many original artists would think twice before releasing music
to the public.  Although rendering music into an open-access
system might dampen that music’s market potential, in the
remix culture this effect is slightly less extreme.  An open-ac-
cess system and a market for original songs are not mutually
103 See id. at 221.
104 Id. at 222.
105 See id. at 223.
106 See id. at 222–23.
107 See Spirit Fingaz, Beyonce Vs Firewater – Bhangra Ladies (DJ Spirit Fingaz
Mashup), SOUNDCLOUD (2011), https://soundcloud.com/spiritfingaz/beyonce-vs-
firewater-bhangra [https://perma.cc/W2S7-TRT3]; TRONICBOX, What Do You
Mean It’s 1985 – Justin Bieber, SOUNDCLOUD (2016), https://soundcloud.com/
jerry-shen-403158940/what-do-you-mean-its-1985-justin-bieber [https://
perma.cc/H5ZX-GLJC].
108 See Benkler, supra note 99, at 222–25. R
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exclusive; although some listeners might choose to listen ex-
clusively to amateur remixes, certainly others will still pay to
own the original artist’s vision of the song.  Moreover, the remix
realm is only a small portion of the music industry.  Musicians
will still have plenty of motivation to remain in the industry—
not just from sales of their original songs but also from touring,
merchandise sales, and endorsement deals.  Of course artists
also create music for psychologically rewarding reasons as
well, but artists’ economic incentives are far more meaningful
in practice.
In order to find the optimal utilitarian balance between
artists’ rights and remix rights in Benkler’s public domain,
however, certain protections for original artists need to be im-
plemented.  Once an item is put into an open-access system, it
becomes “an attractive target for the mischief-makers, proprie-
tary competitors, free-riders, sketchy opportunists, and well-
meaning dolts” who can drive away the very creators that the
system depends on.109  By monitoring sharing platforms for
any signs of foul play, such as users who post bootleg copies of
original songs, platforms like SoundCloud can better align the
interests of both the original artist and the remixer.
IV
THE SOUL BEHIND THE SONGS: PERSONHOOD THEORY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. An Introduction to Personhood Theory
While personality theory has long been a prominent feature
in French and German copyright regimes, the theory did not
have much prevalence in American law until recently.110  This
recent interest in the United States is largely due to Margaret
Jane Radin’s personhood theory, which states that to achieve
proper self-development and flourish as a human being, an
individual needs some control over resources in that individ-
ual’s external environment.111  Her theory is an intuitive one;
nearly everyone can relate to the notion that certain goods are
so inextricably bound up in ourselves that they are vital to our
sense of self-development.  Radin appeals to this notion
109 ALEXANDER & DAGAN, supra note 98, at 227 (quoting Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, R
Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472 (2007)) (citing Lior Strahilevitz’s
critique of Benkler’s theory).
110 See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 173, 174 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
111 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, in PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY,
supra note 98, at 17, 17. R
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through everyday examples, such as an irreplaceable wedding
ring that symbolizes your marriage or the house that you call
home.  Radin’s continuum of property rights ranges from “fun-
gible” to “personal;” wedding rings and homes give rise to per-
sonal rights.  These rights are held for sentimental reasons,
and they are irreplaceable.  On the contrary, fungible rights are
held only for instrumental reasons and goods of equal market
value can replace them.112
Radin identifies two features of personal rights that help
explain why these rights are so intimately bound up with self-
identity.  First, these rights represent an individual’s past ex-
periences as well as that individual’s expectations for the fu-
ture.  Second, loss or damage to these rights are “experienced
as violations of their owner’s self, which transcend the financial
set-back involved.”113  Given the inability of the market to ac-
count for the value of these rights, Radin asserts that personal
rights should receive more protection than fungible rights that
lack this distinctive quality.114  Although Radin calls for a suffi-
ciently objective criteria for determining the point at which a
property right becomes personal rather than fungible, her ap-
proach has been criticized for requiring the law to evaluate the
specific relationship each individual has with the object at
issue.115
B. The Personhood Right in Remix Culture
An artist’s craft is just as intuitively wrapped up in that
artist’s sense of self as a person’s wedding ring or house.  Given
how intimately connected artists are to their work, an artist’s
intellectual property therefore seems to fall toward the personal
rights end of Radin’s continuum.  Songs are intensely personal
creations; artists often express their innermost thoughts
through music—thoughts that they might not feel comfortable
simply saying aloud, even to their closest confidants.  Music is
wrapped up in the past events and feelings that constitute an
artist’s life, as well as current identity and expectations for her
future self.  Moreover, musicians do not make music merely for
instrumental reasons—though for many this is an important
factor, as artists need to earn a living.  Many artists make
music for more personal reasons as well, such as self-expres-
sion and a sense of fulfillment.  Additionally, many musicians
112 Id. at 18.
113 ALEXANDER & DAGAN, supra note 98, at 24–25. R
114 Radin, supra note 111, at 22, 24. R
115 See ALEXANDER & DAGAN, supra note 98, at 26. R
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are highly protective of their work and do not easily hand over
the rights to their songs to record labels, for example.
The personhood theory presents an interesting dilemma in
the remix context.  On the one hand, an artist’s rights in her
music seem deserving of a heightened level of protection over
bootlegged remixes that could distort that artist’s intention for
the song.  If an artist were to create a heartfelt song about the
loss of a loved one, for instance, she might likely be upset to see
an electronic dance music version of her song distributed on a
large scale basis, without even as much as her approval or
acknowledgment.  As favorable as the personhood theory might
seem to original artists, however, this theory affords protec-
tions to remixers, too.  In the same way that an original artist
would feel intimately attached to her creation, so too would a
remixer who poured all of their creative energy into their track,
even if they did not create the lyrics or melody from scratch.
Yet without any property rights in his creation, a remixer might
lack the sense of control and ownership that Radin contends is
so crucial to self-development.116 However, a remixer can still
retain control over his intellectual property without having full
possession over the corresponding right.  A remixer could still
develop their identity by posting remixes to SoundCloud, all the
while sharing a piece of the ownership—through royalties, for
example—with the original artist.  Granted, it would be difficult
to inquire into the subjective personal attachment that each
artist or remixer has to her work.  This task is already difficult
enough in the realm of physical property, let alone intellectual
property.  Yet through careful research, it would not be impos-
sible for policymakers and legislatures to create some objective
standards outlining where these rights should fall on Radin’s
spectrum.
Even if original artists received royalties, however, it is
questionable whether money really reinstates the personhood
right.  After all, personal rights transcend market forces; they
are not replaceable by goods of equal market value like fungible
rights are.  Yet by creating a public good like a song to be
shared with millions, at a certain point the original artist has to
acknowledge that they cannot control every aspect of their
work once it is released to the public.  The song may grow to
have a life of its own, interpreted differently by individuals who
all bring different perspectives to the song.  This is why cover
songs are so popular on YouTube for example; it can be a
116 Radin, supra note 111, at 17. R
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transformative experience to hear a popular song completely
reinterpreted by a new artist who brings new meaning to the
song.  In order to properly acknowledge the original artist’s
personhood right in the remix context, royalties therefore seem
like a fair compromise.  A royalty structure ensures that both
parties, who each have personhood rights in their creations,
are acknowledged.
CONCLUSION: SOLVING THE REMIX RIGHTS STALEMATE
An examination of Lockean labor theory, utilitarian theory,
and personhood theory reveals that property theory is capable
of justifying not only the legal protection of physical property
but also the legal protection of intellectual property.  Yet each
of these theories also reveals drawbacks to recognizing exces-
sively robust rights in intellectual property.  In any context
where two opposing groups of people have conflicting interests,
compromises will have to be made.  These three property theo-
ries suggest that retaining intellectual property rights, yet
qualifying them accordingly when countervailing considera-
tions come into play, will strike the optimal balance between
original artists and remixing artists on music-sharing
platforms.
The application of property theory to the intellectual prop-
erty context sheds insight on some solutions that could better
align the interests of remixers and rightsholders.  For example,
SoundCloud’s shift to a monetized model exemplifies the sym-
biosis that can happen when Lockean labor theory, utilitarian
theory, and personhood theory are all taken into account.  By
distributing royalties to both the remixer and the original art-
ist, SoundCloud recognizes the valuable labor that both parties
have expended into the creation of their respective artworks,
incentivizes both parties to continue creating the music that
brings utility to society, and respectfully acknowledges the per-
sonhood interest that is intimately intertwined with their mu-
sic.  This synergy between remixer and original artist is now a
possibility under SoundCloud’s new “Premier Partnership”
plan, whereby artists who join this membership tier can start
making money on the platform.117  Even under the free version
of SoundCloud, however, SoundCloud’s licensing deals with
record labels allow remixers to benefit from increased name
117 Premier Partnership on SoundCloud, SOUNDCLOUD, https://on.soundcloud.
com/premier [https://perma.cc/KH4U-AVPR].
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recognition, while the platform can still compensate the origi-
nal artists that the rising stars of the remix world rely on.
Although the monetization of remix audio-sharing plat-
forms is a vast improvement over their royalty-free past, these
restructurings do not resolve larger issues such as the uncer-
tainty of fair use that frustrates many remixers.  When an au-
dio-sharing platform removes an amateur remixer’s track at
the request of a large record label who retains the copyright, it
is highly unlikely that remixer will have the resources or moti-
vation to assert a fair use defense in court against the Warner’s
of the world.118  This dilemma poses an imbalance with respect
to each of the three property theories.  When audio-sharing
platforms remove remixes that might very well qualify as fair
use, these removals harm a remixer’s right to the resources
from his labor, reduce the amount of utility-enhancing, innova-
tive art available for music consumers, and delegitimize the
remixer’s sense of self that is intimately bound up in his
creation.
One solution to this issue lies in the legalization of non-
commercial, amateur remixing.119  This could be adopted in
the form of a separate defense to copyright infringement aside
from fair use or even an aspect of fair use itself. This policy
would free amateur remixers from the burden of negotiating
and securing licensing agreements—a luxury that most remix-
ers who are not intending to commercialize their work cannot
afford.120  Additionally, this policy would assuage the minds of
risk-averse remixers who are too concerned about copyright
infringement to post their tracks online.  Since this policy
would only apply to noncommercial remixes, the defense would
vanish once a remixer tried to profit off an unauthorized work.
Limiting the defense to noncommercial remixers ensures that
original artists receive compensation once the remixer starts to
earn revenue.  In this way, the labor and personhood interests
of original artists would remain largely intact, and they would
not lose any significant utilitarian incentive to continue creat-
ing their own craft.  As to the remixers, they would benefit in
having a greater sense of ownership over the deeply personal
creations that they labored over.  Moreover, without the worry
of whether their works will be removed from audio-sharing
118 See Jacqueline D. Lipton & John Tehranian, Derivative Works 2.0: Recon-
sidering Transformative Use in the Age of Crowdsourced Creation, 109 NW. U. L.
REV. 383, 387 (2015).
119 See id. at 427.
120 See id. at 429.
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platforms or infringe copyright law, remixers would feel en-
couraged to actively participate in these communities.  This
boost in utility for remixers would flow downstream to the
larger music community, as listeners would have a more vi-
brant and diverse collection of songs to choose from.
This solution assumes, however, that noncommercial
remixes on platforms like SoundCloud do not significantly de-
crease the market demand for commercial remixes.  If the avail-
ability of noncommercial remixes does in fact dampen market
demand, then legalization of this art form could interfere with
the right of original artists to create their own derivative works.
For example, even though a nonprofessional remixer who
uploads her track on SoundCloud may not reap any royalties,
her remix might nevertheless divert royalties away from the
original artist and publisher.  The reason for this diversion
would be twofold: not only would the remixer be entitled to use
the original artist’s song for free but her noncommercial remix
might also take away market share from professional remixers,
who in turn pay the original artist.
However, many commentators believe that remixes actu-
ally boost the popularity of the original artist’s song, as new
listeners might be drawn to artists whose works were sam-
pled.121  Moreover, if a remixer’s track becomes popular and
she decides to commercialize it, original artists will reap royal-
ties as they share in the profits.  No solution is perfect, but if
the aim of copyright law is to foster artistic innovation, a de-
fense for noncommercial remixing might strike the best bal-
ance between the interests of all involved.122  Indeed, the
Supreme Court noted that “the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works.”123  Remixes are an immensely trans-
formative art form, and a noncommercial remixing defense
could help ensure that the uncertainty of the fair use doctrine
does not stifle such creative expression.
The importance of striking the right balance between
remixers and rightsholders expands far beyond the boundaries
of audio-sharing platforms themselves.  The effects of these
policies ripple outward and send signals about how our society
121 See id. at 437 (explaining how DJ Danger Mouse’s The Grey Album “likely
served as a music discovery tool” for listeners who previously were not fans of the
Beatles or Jay-Z, the two artists that DJ Danger Mouse fused together in his
mash-up).
122 See id. at 387.
123 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 30  8-NOV-16 13:30
240 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:211
values artistic innovation and intellectual property rights.
Finding a point of equilibrium between two vastly different
types of artists is no easy task.  This aim for balance requires
compromise, and the nuanced property theories that scholars
have discussed and dissected over the years provide a useful
starting point.  As these solutions illustrate, the application of
property theory to the intellectual property context can pro-
foundly revitalize discussion about copyright law and remix
culture among both policymakers and major industry players.
And in a music industry that is rapidly evolving in today’s user-
generated remix culture, this discussion is one that has never
been more crucial to have.
